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ABSTRACT
A test of adverse events and strategic timing theories can be conducted by determining whether some
relevant financial decision variables, such as financial benefit from filing for bankruptcy, or debt
discharged in bankruptcy are endogenous with the bankruptcy decision or not. For the strategic
timing theory such decisions are endogenous, while for the adverse events theory they are not.
Hausman tests for endogeneity show that financial benefit, unsecured debt, and non-exempt assets
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Among the several theories put forth to understand the determinants of a household's 
decision to file for bankruptcy, two have received particular attention: the adverse events 
theory and the strategic timing theory.  
 
The adverse events theory postulates that consumers file for bankruptcy mainly because 
they experience adverse events, and financial stresses associated with such events. 
Adverse events occur, for example, in the form of a job loss, medical problems, and 
particular family issues such as divorce. Financial stresses associated with such events 
arise, for example, in the form of income interruption, income reduction, or debt increase.  
 
The strategic timing theory postulates that a rational consumer incorporates in her 
decision-making, the bankruptcy option available under law, and its associated costs and 
benefits, and making the best use of her economic environment, chooses an optimal time 
to file for bankruptcy. In particular, if the best choice includes a strategic, and lawful, use 
of debt and the bankruptcy system, then that is reflected in consumer choice.  
 
Both theories are emblems of long-standing debates to derive an optimal bankruptcy law; 
one that balances rights of a creditor against misfortune of a debtor, one that protects a 
creditor from a dishonest debtor, and one that trades-off losses in bankruptcy against 
increases in expected economic growth from greater risk-taking arising from wealth 
insurance. In the United States, examples of such debates are found in early conventions 
regarding the U.S. Constitution, as can be seen in Warren (1935).  
 
It is important to understand which theory is correct, because each theory is based on 
different assumptions on consumer behaviors, and therefore, each theory implies 
potentially different policy responses to reduce bankruptcy filings. For example, if 
adverse events theory is correct, and if it is determined that bankruptcy filings are too 
high, then policies to reduce bankruptcy filings could include, among others, those that 
minimize the impact of adverse events, or increase financial literacy for planning for such 
events. On the other hand, if strategic timing theory is correct, then policies to reduce 
filings could include, among others, those that tighten access to bankruptcy courts, or 
make bankruptcy more expensive, perhaps by lowering exemptions, diverting more 
debtors to longer repayment plans, lengthening minimum time between repeat filings, or 
requiring debt management programs outside of bankruptcy.  
 
In deriving a test of these theories, a simple model for the strategic timing theory is easy 
to formulate using a standard economic model of consumer decision-making. A 
comparable model for the adverse events theory is not available, and a simple model is 
formulated here using a standard economic model and incorporating some basic 
ingredients of consumer behavior consistent with the adverse events theory.  
 
Using these models, this paper formulates a simple test of these two competing theories. 
Essentially, this test determines whether a consumer’s decision to file for bankruptcy and 
her decision regarding some variables relevant for filing (for example, unsecured debt, or 
  3financial benefit, or non-exempt assets) are both endogenously determined, or not. For 
the strategic timing theory, it is easy to see that these decisions are endogenously and 
simultaneously determined. For the adverse events theory, the model here implies that 
decisions regarding unsecured debt or financial benefit are exogenous to the filing 
decision.  
 
The dataset used here is a combined cross section and time series sample of PSID 
households over the period 1984-95; the same dataset is used in Fay, Hurst, and White 
(2002).
1 The model specifications are similar to their work as well. In each of two models 
of interest, two estimations are conducted – one using least squares specification, and the 
other using log-normal specification.
2 In all four cases, the results are consistent with 
adverse events theory.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 
formulates simple models of these two theories, and a prediction based on these models. 
Section 4 presents test results.  
 
 
2.  Related Literature  
 
There is a long literature that tries to understand household bankruptcy decisions. Early 
work is presented in Stanley and Girth (1971), based on a study of bankruptcy cases 
closed in 1964.  
 
Results of studies of bankrupt debtors in 1981, in 1991, and their comparison are 
provided in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 2000, 1994), respectively. These 
authors relate bankrupt debtors to the population, and conclude that bankruptcy is mainly 
due to adverse events. Moreover, Domowitz and Sartain (1999), combining data from 
filings in the early 1980s and the Survey of Consumer Finances, present evidence of the 
role of credit card debt and adverse events (especially medical debt) in bankruptcy 
decisions.  
 
Using comprehensive data aggregated by bankruptcy district, White (1987) provides 
evidence of economic incentives in bankruptcy by showing that bankruptcy filings are 
positively related to exemption levels. Moreover, using data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) (henceforth denoted FHW) show strong 
evidence that financial benefit from bankruptcy affects a household’s decision to file for 
bankruptcy. As mentioned in their work, a distinction between adverse events and 
strategic timing theories is not clear, but for the most part, direct inclusion of variables 
for adverse events (such as health problems, divorce, and length of unemployment) does 
not significantly affect the bankruptcy decision. Additional aspects of these incentives are 
explored in White (1998), and in Fan and White (2003). Further, using the same dataset 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Erik Hurst for making this dataset available to us.  
2 As mentioned below, additional estimators such as the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator and the 
robust estimator could not be applied successfully to this dataset.  
  4as FHW, Han and Li (2004) study how the bankruptcy decision is jointly determined with 
labor supply decision. 
 
Gross and Souleles (2002), using credit card data, provide evidence of growing 
bankruptcies over 1995-97, after controlling for changes in risk composition of 
borrowers; a finding consistent with their hypothesis of declining social costs or declining 
bankruptcy stigma. A related dynamic is reported in FHW, and it is further consistent 
with an impact of local legal culture on bankruptcy decisions. Additional empirical 
studies are discussed in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000).
3          
 
Ausubel (1991) investigates the nature of competition in the credit card industry, sticky 
credit card interest rates, and relatively high returns on credit card operations, and 
presents some theoretical explanations for such observations. Ausubel (1997) provides 
additional information on the counter-cyclical nature of credit card delinquencies and 
defaults, and combining this with credit card profitability, considers the dynamic from 
high rates to high defaults.  
 
Some theoretical models for default and bankruptcy with competitive and incomplete 
markets are considered in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2003), Zame (1993), 
Geanakoplos and Zame (1997), Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1999), Araujo and 
Pascoa (2002), Sabarwal (2003), and Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005), among 
others.  
 
3.  Two Models and a Prediction  
 
This section develops different models of personal bankruptcy that reflect household 
decisions regarding filing for bankruptcy based on (1) the occurrence of adverse events, 
or on (2) an endogenous choice of variables relevant for bankruptcy filing (such as debt, 
or financial benefit). These models yield a prediction that is testable with observed data.   
 
Adverse Events Theory  
 
In recent years, frequent support for the adverse events theory has been advanced by 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 1994, 2000), among others. Using data from 
bankruptcy filings in 1981 (for Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas), and in 1991 (for 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Texas, California, and Tennessee), these authors paint a rich 
portrait of consumers in bankruptcy, they present statistics that indicate similarities 
between  bankrupt debtors and the general population, especially middle-class families, 
and they present a variety of cases and statistics to conclude that while some cases of 
abuse of bankruptcy law may exist, bankruptcy is predominantly due to adverse events. 
As they put it succinctly,
4 “No one plans to go bankrupt.”  
 
                                                 
3 Several other reports have informed discussions of reforms in bankruptcy law; an analysis of some of 
these reports is provided in General Accounting Office (1998, 1999).  
4 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), page 73.  
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demographic characteristics usually associated with somewhat stable middle class 
families, experiences some adverse events that compel this person to file for bankruptcy. 
Such events could include, for example, a job loss, a reduction in number of hours 
worked, a change from a higher-paying job to a lower-paying job, a medical condition, 
divorce, and so on. In addition to their direct effects on household earnings, such events 
have indirect effects on household financial well-being as well. For example, job-related 
adverse events can lead to lower levels of health insurance or lower pension plan 
contributions; medical conditions and other adverse events can lead to higher levels of 
expensive credit card debt; and any adverse event can lead to greater probability of 
default on a home mortgage, or on other debt. Against a backdrop of increasing health-
care costs, increasing rates of health uninsurance, a noticeable incidence of job skids
5  
and associated losses in fringe benefits, and deepening debt markets via subprime lending 
(whether in the form of high loan-to-value mortgages, or credit card debt for borrowers 
with greater probability of default, or increasing maturity of automobile loans), the 
impact of adverse events on household finances may be large enough for a consumer to 
file for bankruptcy.  
 
In terms of formulating a model for this theory, it is useful to keep in mind that a pattern 
that emerges consistently in this theory is that there are some events for which consumers 
do not plan (even if they may, in principle, be aware of the existence of such events), and 
if such an event occurs, then they may be compelled to file for bankruptcy. If such an 
event does not occur, consumers do not consider filing for bankruptcy. For a statement 
like this to be true in a model of this theory, it is important to answer at least two 
questions. First, why don't consumers plan for some events? Second, even if they don't 
plan for some events, why do they not include a bankruptcy option in the events for 
which they do plan?  
 
Consumers might not plan for some events if they assign an event a subjective probability 
of zero. For example, we observe that in surveys of individual mortality, some consumers 
list as zero their probability of next-period mortality (Gan, Hurd, and McFadden, 2005). 
Such an assignment can arise if the cost of making very fine probability distinctions is 
relatively high, or it can arise as a mistake that has a miniscule impact. For example, in 
the PSID data, the probability of bankruptcy is 0.003017, as reported in FHW. Moreover, 
such an assignment could arise from effectively incomplete markets. For example, there 
are limits to coverage for virtually all types of standardized insurance contracts, whether 
auto, health, or unemployment, and of course, with some positive probability, an event 
could occur where coverage is inadequate. Thus, subjective probability may be zero, but 
objective probability may be positive.  
 
It is somewhat harder to justify theoretically why, in events for which consumers 
otherwise plan, they do not include a bankruptcy option that is legally, and in principle, 
                                                 
5 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) present some evidence from the 1992 Worker Displacement 
Survey, and the Census Bureau that of the workers who were laid-off during 1990-92, and who had worked 
full-time for at least three years before their lay-off, about one-quarter had regained full-time work at the 
time of the survey, but were working at a lower wage than earlier.  
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filing is low relative to costs; for example, as reported in FHW, for families that can gain 
from a bankruptcy filing, the mean benefit from filing is $7,813, and the probability of 
filing is 0.003017, for an ex-ante filing benefit of about $25. This is less than the cost of a 
planning session with a bankruptcy lawyer, or the resources expended to purchase and 
plan with a book on how-to-file. Another explanation can be provided in terms of utility 
penalties arising from future reputation losses from filing; for example, see Dubey, 
Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). Such losses can arise from a combination of restricted 
future access to debt markets, credit score impact (for severity of credit score impact, see 
Musto 2004,) and loss of option to re-file for some period (six years for a Chapter 7 
filing). If such losses are very high when consumers file in the absence of adverse events, 
and such losses outweigh benefits of filing, then in non-adverse events, consumers may 
optimally decide to not consider a bankruptcy option. For example, a bankruptcy flag on 
a consumer credit report is one of the worst derogatories on a credit report, and it stays 
there for ten years, but the legal system allows a Chapter 7 re-filing after six years. 
Consequently, the longer memory of a bankruptcy filing by financial institutions 
increases the cost of filing by increasing future costs of accessing debt markets.  
 
Therefore, as a first approximation, we may view adverse events consumers as taking 
decisions sequentially; in period 1, they plan for some events, and in such events, they do 
not plan to file for bankruptcy, but they do not plan for other events (termed adverse 
events). In period 2, if a planned-for event occurs, they consume as planned, and if an 
adverse event occurs, they include a bankruptcy option in their decision-making and re-
optimize accordingly. In other words, in period 1, “no one plans to go bankrupt.”  
 
Notably, the explanations given above are based on the currently realized situation, and 
may be taken as an approximation that may hold for small changes in the current 
situation. Such an approximation may not necessarily hold, if the economic and legal 
environment is very different; whether in the same economy under consideration, or in a 
different economy. As shown by FHW, the bankruptcy decision is significantly affected 
by financial benefit from filing. Therefore, if large changes are considered to a legal or 
economic system, or a very different system is considered, additional justification would 
be useful before applying this version of adverse events theory.  
 
This simple version of adverse events decision-making is sufficient to derive a test for the 
theories under consideration. Consider a standard, two-period decision-making 
framework. In the first period, there is one decision node. In the second period, one of 
three states of the world prevail; a good state, indexed g, a bad state, indexed b, and a 
terrible state, indexed t. Each state corresponds to a decision node, and the probability of 
each state is πg, πb, and πt, respectively, with πg + πb + πt = 1.  
 
As usual, a consumer has to decide how much to consume at each node; his consumption 
is indexed c0, cg, cb, and ct. Moreover, lending markets are available to him at a one-
period, risk-adjusted, market interest rate r. As usual, a single consumer takes interest 
rates as given. His endowment in consumption units at each node is denoted w0, wg, wb, 
and wt. (For convenience, suppose w0 = 0, and 0 < wt < wb < wg.) Moreover, he has to 
  7decide how much debt to take, subject to some exogenously specified debt limit; 
indexed 0 > d . His twice continuously differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is 
denoted   with  ) (c u . ) ( lim , ) ( lim , 0 , 0 0 ∞ = ∞ = ′ < ′ ′ > ′ ∞ → → c u c u u u c c  His expected utility is 
)]. ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( 0 t t b b g g c u c u c u c u U π π π δ + + + =   
 
An adverse events consumer takes decisions sequentially. In period 1, he plans for states 
g, b, and he plans to remain solvent in these states, but he does not plan for state t. In 
period 2, if g or b occurs, he consumes as planned, but if t occurs, he considers the option 
to file for bankruptcy. There are some costs of filing for bankruptcy; usually some loss of 
assets, court fees, lawyer fees, limited future participation in debt markets, and so on. 
Benefits of filing include, among others, discharge of debt, fresh start, and accompanying 
wealth insurance. Adapting a simple form of a Chapter 7 filing,
6 it is assumed that a filer 
gives up all his assets except any exemptions from forfeiture provided by law, and his 
debt is discharged.
7 Exemptions specified under law are summarized by e. For the 
clearest distinctions between the two theories, suppose  . 0 g b t w e w w < ≤ < <  (That is, 
exemptions are sufficiently high to have non-negative financial benefit from filing in bad 
and terrible states, but not necessarily in a good state.) Consequently, an adverse events 
consumer solves the following problem.  
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In Stage I, a consumer decides optimal debt and consumption (d, c0, cg, cb), and by 
assumption, he does not file in g, b. Given d > 0, and wt < e, in Stage II, if t occurs, 
optimal choice is to file and consume ct = wt. The appendix shows existence of a solution 
for this problem, and some comparisons with a strategic timing consumer.  
 
Strategic Timing Theory  
 
A strategic timing consumer is a standard rational consumer who includes the bankruptcy 
option in her maximization problem. Assumptions regarding decision nodes, 
                                                 
6 Chapter 7 bankruptcies account for about 70 percent of all bankruptcies.  
7 The other main personal bankruptcy category, Chapter 13 bankruptcy, accounting for about 29 percent of 
all cases, can be viewed in this formulation as follows. In this type of filing, a repayment plan proposed by 
the debtor is confirmed by the Court, and a discharge of remaining debt is provided on successful 
completion of the plan. In this case, net assets saved and debts discharged depend on the repayment plan, 
and can be mapped to this model after an appropriate discounting for period of plan. Exemptions provided 
under law are the same in both cases.  
  8endowments, utility functions, and expected utility are the same as in the previous case. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the bankruptcy process is the same as in the previous case. 
Of course, the difference is in the optimization problem. In each state in the second 
period, a strategic timing consumer has an option to file for bankruptcy, and solves the 
following problem.  
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The maximum operator for decision nodes in the second period corresponds to the 
bankruptcy decision. For example, if a consumer decides not to file in g, her constraint is 
wg - (1+r)d, and if she decides to file, her constraint is min(wg,e), where, as before, e 
captures exemptions permitted in bankruptcy. Recall that  , 0 g b t w e w w < ≤ < < as before.  
 
In this case, it is easy to see that a strategic timing consumer files in b and t, and 
therefore, more frequently than an adverse event consumer. Moreover, depending on the 
economic environment, a strategic timing consumer might or might not file in g, but an 
adverse events consumer does not file in g. The appendix characterizes the solution for 




One clear distinction between the strategic timing and adverse events theory is that for 
strategic timing consumers, the bankruptcy decision and the debt decision (and 
consequently, financial benefit) are jointly determined, whereas for adverse events 
consumers, the debt decision (and consequently, financial benefit) is exogenous to the 
filing decision.  
 
Notice that the test here is, in principle, independent from conclusions in FHW. The 
insignificance of coefficients on variables for adverse events can be viewed as negating a 
strong version of the adverse events theory; that is, there is little evidence that ceteris 
paribus, (in particular after controlling for financial benefit,) consumers file for 
bankruptcy on the occurrence of an adverse event, such as a medical problem, or 
unemployment, or divorce. Of course, as described in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
(2000), another channel for the operation of adverse events is through their impact on 
consumer debt and consumer wealth, (and consequently, on financial benefit from 
bankruptcy,) and on earned income, (and consequently, on repayment ability.) In 
particular, an increase in financial benefit could arise from an occurrence of adverse 
events or from strategic timing. For example, financial benefit increases when unsecured 
debt increases, whether due to an adverse event, such as unemployment, or due to a 
  9strategic increase in credit card debt before filing for bankruptcy. Therefore, it is possible 
that increased financial benefit could increase the probability of filing based on 
occurrence of adverse events. Nevertheless, a distinction between these two theories can 
be derived by investigating whether financial benefit is endogenous to the bankruptcy 
decision or not.  
 
 
4.  Data and Results  
 
The dataset used here is a combined cross section and time series sample of PSID 
households over the period 1984-95; the same dataset is used in FHW. We consider three 
specifications, close to FHW as well, as follows:  
) ( ) file Pr( 1fb X γ β + Φ =     ( 1 )  
() ) ( file Pr 3 2 ne d X γ γ β + + Φ =      (2) 
() ) ( file Pr 4 AE d X η γ β + + Φ =      (3) 
 
In all three specifications, the independent variable, file or not, indicates whether a 
household files for bankruptcy or not. The variable fb is financial benefit from filing, and 
is defined as  where d is debt discharged in bankruptcy, and ne is 
non-exempt assets given up in bankruptcy, defined as 
), 0 , max( ne d fb − =
), 0 , max( e w ne − =  where w is 
wealth, and e measures exemptions. The vector AE represents adverse events, and 
includes a dummy for divorce, length of unemployment in weeks, and a dummy for 
health problems. The explicit assumption here is that adverse events are exogenous to the 
bankruptcy decisions. In other words, people do not intentionally experience these 
adverse events for the purpose of filing for bankruptcy. The variable X is a vector of 
control variables, including demographic variables, a proxy for local trends, a proxy for 
legal fees for filing, and state-level variables.
8  
 
The key coefficients are γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, and η. An interpretation in FHW is that a positive γ1 
and γ4, a positive γ2, and a negative γ3 are consistent with strategic behavior, and positive 
coefficients η are consistent with adverse events behavior. As mentioned above, the test 
here is different, because it allows for an impact of adverse events on debt, on wealth, 
and on financial benefit, and consequently, on probability of filing via the γ coefficients. 
Therefore, the interpretation here is that although directional results for the γ coefficients 
may possibly be consistent with either theory, a distinction still emerges from the 
endogeneity or exogeneity of variables such as financial benefit, non-exempt assets, and 
debt.  
 
                                                 
8 Demographic variables include age and squared age of head of household, years of education of head, 
family size, a dummy for household owning home, and a dummy for household owning a business. The 
proxy for local legal trends is the one-year-lagged aggregate bankruptcy rate in the household's bankruptcy 
district. The (inverse) proxy of legal fees is the per capita number of lawyers. A higher number of per 
capita lawyers indicate more competitions and hence lower legal fees. State-level variables include growth 
of average income in household’s state, county level unemployment rate, and standard deviation of income 
per capita in the state. These variables are used in FHW as well.  
  10Let the null hypothesis be the adverse events theory. In particular, for the specification in 
(1), the null hypothesis is H0: fb is exogenous. For the specification in (2), the null 
hypothesis is H0: d and ne are exogenous. The specification in (3) is no longer 
appropriate for our test since the vector AE now serves as exogenous variables for the 
Hausman endogeneity test, and can no longer enter directly as factors to explain 
bankruptcy decisions. 
 
The Hausman test is a two-stage process. At the first stage, we estimate fb, or d and ne 
using the set of exogenous variables AE and additional controls Z. The predicted values 
of fb, or d and ne are then used in the second stage to predict a household’s decision to 
file for bankruptcy. Since fb is a function of d and ne, while ne is a function of w and 
exogenous exemption value e,
9 we need only to estimate d and w in the first stage. The 
predicted values of fb and ne can be calculated using the predicted d and w from the first 
stage. 
 
As a benchmark, consider first a least square estimator of wealth and debt, as follows: 
 









,    (4) 
 
where X is the vector of control variables. First stage regression results for both w and d 
are reported in the “Least Square” panel in Table 1.  
 
Consider next an estimator that assumes both w and d are log-normally distributed.  
Wealth and income are often considered to be log-normally distributed (see, for example, 
Crow and Shimizu, 1988). A nonparametric density of d reveals that d also has a 
distribution that is close to log-normal. However, a log-normal density requires all 
observations are positive. Since 7.56 percent of observations of w are negative, and an 
additional 7.01 percent of observations of w are zero, it is necessary to make a 
transformation of w.  We assign a wealth of $1 to those households with negative or zero 
wealth. The negative value of w is included as part of debt. We then assign a debt of $1 to 
those households with zero debt. The new debt, denoted as d1, now includes the negative 
part of wealth with minimum level of debt of $1. Similarly, the new wealth, denoted as 
w1, is now all positive, with minimum level of wealth of $1. Therefore, equation (4) 
becomes: 
 
d d d w d
w w w w w
AE X d
AE X w
ε μ λ λ δ
ε μ θ θ δ
+ + + + =
+ + + + =
= <
= <
1 2 0 1 1
1 2 0 1 1
1 1 1 ) log(
1 1 ) log(
,   (5) 
 
                                                 
9 Historically, exemption levels were affected by political constituencies; in states with large farmlands and 
farming communities, higher exemption levels can be observed. This is reflected in a special procedure, 
Chapter 12, for family farmer bankruptcies as well. However, data available from 1986 to present show that 
annually, Chapter 12 bankruptcies are a miniscule proportion (less than 0.01 percent) of total bankruptcies. 
As mentioned above, this paper focuses more on consumer bankruptcies, in which case, exemptions are 
reasonably assumed to be exogenous.   
  11where εw and εd have normal distributions. It is expected that w and d may be correlated. 
The raw correlation coefficients between the w and d, between w1 and d1, and between 
log(w1) and log(d1) are .0842, .0644, and -.0577, respectively. Therefore, the error terms 
εw and εd are allowed to be correlated.  
 
In principle, negative wealth can affect a household decision differently from unsecured 
debt. Negative wealth comes from negative net worth of real estate, farms/businesses, 
and vehicles. Loans on these are usually secured by the assets themselves. In the case of 
default, (or bankruptcy,) these assets are repossessed by creditors, (or sold by the trustee 
of the estate,) likely making it costlier for the debtor to provide a good substitute for such 
an asset. But unsecured debt does not carry this additional loss of an asset. Unsecured 
household debt includes credit card charges, student loans, medical, or legal bills, or 
loans from relatives. To distinguish between these two types of debts, dummies are 
included in the wealth equation to indicate if a household’s wealth was originally 
negative, or zero. Similarly, dummies are included in the debt equation to indicate if a 
household’s debt includes negative wealth, and if a household’s debt is zero. Finally, the 
log of household income for last period is used, instead of the level itself, to minimize the 
effect of income outliers. Households with zero income are assigned an income of $1. A 
dummy for zero income is included in the model. Maximum likelihood is used to jointly 
estimate equations (5). The second panel in Table 1, denoted as “log-normal”, illustrates 
estimation results.  
 
In stage 1, adverse events are represented by four variables – a dummy for divorce, 
period of unemployment in weeks, squared period of unemployment, and a dummy for 
health problems. These four variables enter the first stage regression only. As shown in 
Table 1, for the least square estimator, the coefficients for adverse events are not 
significantly estimated. For the lognormal estimator, in the debt equation, the coefficients 
for adverse events are not statistically significant, but in the wealth equation, both divorce 
and health problem would significantly reduce a household’s wealth. Divorce would 
reduce a household’s wealth by 14.4%, while the health problem would reduce a 
household’s wealth by 23.3%.  
 
For both estimators, the coefficients for many control variables are significantly 
estimated. In some cases, both estimators yield similar results. For example, a household 
with a higher labor income has more wealth and more debt, while a household with a 
larger income reduction at the last period has lower wealth and lower debt. More years of 
education of head of the household increases both wealth and debt, while a larger 
household has less wealth but more debt. A household who owns business has higher 
wealth and higher debt. In other cases, the two estimators may yield different results. For 
example, owning a house appears to have no impact on a household’s unsecured debt, if 
the least square estimator is used, but a household’s debt increases by 8.1%, if the 
lognormal estimator is used. The difference between the two estimators may come from 
the different specifications in independent variables, and the different assumptions in 
error distributions.  
 
  12For the log-normal estimation, the dummy for negative wealth is statistically significantly 
estimated, indicating that the unsecured portion of secured debt (negative wealth) is 
indeed different from unsecured debt. The dummies for zero wealth or debts are also 
significantly estimated, indicating that zeros may be systematically different from non-
zeros. The dummy for zero labor income is statistically significant, indicating that non-
labor income may differ systematically from those households with labor income and 
those households without labor income. Finally, the correlation coefficient between the 
log of wealth and the log of debt is statistically insignificant from zero.  
 
Let the predicted wealth and debt from the first stage be  and  . The predicted non-
exempt assets ne and financial benefits fb are calculated by:  





























The predicted   and   now enter into the second stage to form the Hausman test. 






In table 2, first, a probit is conducted for whether a household files for bankruptcy, using 
observed financial benefit fb. Then predicted financial benefit  is used to conduct the 
same probit. As wealth and debt are slightly different in the two estimations, (because of 
transformation,) the fb variable is slightly different in these estimations as well. Therefore, 
two probits are reported for each estimation, one using the observed data (denoted as 
“observed” in table 2), and the other using the predicted , denoted as either “least 




In table 2, when observed data are used, financial benefit positively affects probability of 
filing bankruptcy.
10 However, if predicted  from least square estimator is used,   
now has a negative effect on the probability of filing bankruptcy. If the predicted   
from the lognormal estimator is used, the coefficient for  is no longer significant.  




Similarly, in table 3, first, a probit is conducted for whether a household files for 
bankruptcy, using observed d and ne, and then their predicted values are used to conduct 
the same probit. In table 3, the level of d positively, and the level of ne negatively affect 
the bankruptcy decision.
11 However, the effect of  and    on the bankruptcy decision 





                                                 
10 For reference, coefficients in the first column of Table 2 can be compared to those reported in the 
comparable specification in FHW.  
11 For reference, coefficients in the first column of Table 3 can be compared to those reported in the 
comparable specification in FHW.  
  13effect on the bankruptcy decision, but  from the lognormal estimation has no 
statistically significant effect.  
d ˆ
 
Another interesting observation from tables 2 and 3 is about the coefficients of control 
variables X. No matter using the observed fb, d, and ne, or using the predicted ,   and 
 from different estimation methods, their corresponding coefficients and their standard 
errors are all very close.  




The Hausman test statistic has a χ
2 distribution with 58 degrees of freedom. The 5% 
critical value is 76.8, and the 10% critical value is 72.1. In all cases, the Hausman test 
statistics are relatively much smaller than the 10% critical value. For specification (1) in 
table 2, the Hausman test statistic is 9.62 for the least square estimator and 11.7 for the 
lognormal estimation. For specification (2) in table 3, the Hausman test statistics are 
negative: -7.00 for the least square estimator and -.94 for the lognormal estimator. In 
these two cases, we calculate generalized Hausman test statistic.
12 For the least square 
estimator, the generalized Hausman test statistic is 58.3. For the lognormal estimator, the 
generalized Hausman test statistic is 59.5.
13  In both cases, we fail to reject the H0 
hypothesis. The tests here favor the adverse event theory.  
 
Notice that there are several limitations of this work.  
 
As is well-known, wealth data in the PSID are not available with the ideal frequency and 
detail for several aspects of bankruptcy research. (Additional data limitations and their 
effects are described in FHW.)  
 
Moreover, it would be good to have results from additional empirical specifications of the 
models. For reference, two additional tests for stage 1 results were tried on these data – 
one using least absolute deviation, (and censored least absolute deviation for financial 
benefit,) and another using robust regression. The LAD estimator failed to converge, and 
the robust regression estimator predicted wealth poorly enough to yield too many zeroes 
for predicted non-exempt assets, and led predicted non-exempt assets to be dropped in the 
second stage, and consequently, a drop of the variable squared non-exempt assets, and the 
interaction term.  
 
Furthermore, the model of adverse events formulated here is one model of adverse events 
theory. We are not aware of another model of adverse events that can be compared 
directly with a standard economic model. The model formulated is designed to capture an 
important aspect of adverse events theory (“no consumer plans to go bankrupt”), and 
designed to capture this effect in the simplest possible manner. No doubt, other models 
                                                 
12 Consider two estimates:   and  . Under H
0 ˆ β a β ˆ 0,   is consistent and efficient, while   is only consistent. 
The Hausman test statistic is calculated as 
0 ˆ β a β ˆ





0 − − −
− −  while the generalized 
Hausman test statistic is given by: () ( )( ) a a a Var β β β β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 0
1 '
0 − − −
− .  
13 The generalized Hausman test statistics for specifications (1) are: 55.3 for least square estimator and 63.5 
for lognormal estimator. Again, the adverse event theory is favored. 
  14may yield different testable predictions, and additional research would be very helpful to 




  15Appendix  
 
Solution to optimization problem for an adverse events consumer  
 
Notice that the first-order condition for the consumer's stage I problem is:  
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 ) 1 ( ' 1 ) 1 ( ' 1 ' = + − + − + − + − = d r w u r d r w u r d u d MU b b g g
AE π δ π δ  
Moreover, as   for d small enough, MU () , ' lim 0 ∞ = ↓ d u d
AE(d)>0,  and for d sufficiently 
large, wg - (1+r)d, and wb - (1+r)d are sufficiently small, and hence, MU
AE(d)<0.  
Therefore, there is unique d
* ≡ d
*AE > 0 such that MU
AE(d
*AE)=0. Furthermore, it is easy 
to check that  , and consequently, if  , then  0 / ) ( < ∂ ∂ d d MU
AE AE d d
* ≤
() ( )
AE AE AE d MU d MU




*AE) . Comparisons with 
strategic timing consumers are provided below.  
 
Solution to optimization problem for a strategic timing consumer  
 
For the state g, the optimal decision of a strategic timing consumer can be characterized 
as follows. Notice that utility of filing in g, when debt is d, is 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = , and utility of not filing is 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u c u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . 
 
Consider the action of not filing. Then marginal utility is: 
. Notice that marginal utility is decreasing in 
debt, because 
() ( ) ) ( ' 1 ) ( ' , g g
ST c u r d u d not MU π δ + − =
() ( ) 0 ) ( ' ' 1 ) ( ' ' / ,
2 < + + = ∂ ∂ g g
ST c u r d u d d not MU π δ . Moreover, 
, implies that for   small enough, MU 0 lim ( ) d ud ↓ ′ =∞ d
ST(not,d)>0,  and for d sufficiently 
large, wg-(1+r)d  is sufficiently small, and hence,  ( ) 0 , not < d MU
ST . Therefore, there is a 
unique   such that  0
* > d ( ) 0 , not
* = d MU
ST . Furthermore,  ( ) 0 / , not < ∂ ∂ d d MU
ST  
implies that if  , then  , and if d>d
* d d < ) , not ( ) , no (
* d MU d t MU
ST ST ≥
*, then 
. Consequently, if a consumer considers not filing, then 
maximum utility possible when debt limit is 
) , not ( ) , not (
* d MU d MU
ST ST <
d  is as follows: if 
* d d ≤ , then maximum 
utility is  ( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = , and if 
* d d > , 
then maximum utility is: 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = . 
 
Consider the action of filing. Then marginal utility is MU
ST(file,d)=u
’(d)>0, and 
consequently, the optimal debt choice is to set  d d = . Therefore, if a consumer considers 
filing, the maximum utility when debt limit is d  is: 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . 
  16In order to characterize the optimal decision, it is useful to define the level of debt at 
which the consumer is financially indifferent between filling or not. That is, let   solve 
. In other words, let  . 
d ˆ
e d r wg = + − ˆ ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) ( ˆ r e w d g + − =
 
Suppose  d d ˆ ≤ . That is, debt limit is small relative to  . (In other words,  d ˆ
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( + − ≤ + − = . That is, exemptions are small relative to net wealth 
after maximum possible debt payoff.) Then the consumer’s optimal decision is not to file 
in g. This can be seen by separately considering two cases: 
* d d ≤ , and 
* d d > . 
 
If 
* d d ≤ , then maximum utility from not filing is: 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = , 
and maximum utility from filing is  ( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . 
Moreover,  d d ˆ ≤  implies that  d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( + − ≤ + − = , and consequently, 
( ) ( ) d U d U , file , not ≥ . 
 
 If 
* d d > , then maximum utility from not filing is: 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = , 
and maximum utility from filing is  ( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . 
Moreover,  d d ˆ ≤ , and the optimality of   imply that 
* d
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () e u d u d r w u d u d r w u d u g g g g g δπ δπ δπ + ≥ + − + > + − + 1 1
* * , and 
consequently,  ( ) ( ) ( ) d U d U d U , file , not , not
* ≥ ≥ . 
 
Consider now the case  d d ˆ > . That is, debt limit is large relative to d . (In other words,  ˆ
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( + − > + − = . That is, exemptions are large relative to net wealth 
after maximum possible debt payoff.) Then the filing decision is a little more nuanced, 
and it depends on the tradeoff between exemptions and net wealth after paying off 
endogenously determined debt use. This can be seen by separately considering the 
following cases: when  (that is, exemptions are large relative to net wealth after 
paying off optimal debt in the case of not filing) and when   (that is, exemptions 
are small relative to net wealth after paying off optimal debt in the case of not filing). 
* ˆ d d ≤
* ˆ d d >
Suppose  . (In other words, exemptions are large relative to wealth after 
paying off  .) Then the optimal decision is to file, and it can be seen by considering the 
following two cases. If 
* ˆ d d ≤
* d
* d d ≤ , then maximum utility from not filing is: 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = , and maximum utility from 
filing is  [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . Moreover,  d d ˆ >  implies 
that  d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( + − > + − = , and consequently,  ( ) ( ) d U d U , not , file > . If 
  17* d d > , then maximum utility from not filing is 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U π π π δ + + + − + = , 
and maximum utility from filing is  [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U π π π δ + + + = . 
Moreover,   implies that 
* ˆ d d ≤ d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( + − > + − = , and consequently, 
( ) ( ) d U d U , not , file > . 
 
Suppose  . (Exemptions are small relative to d
* ˆ d d >
*.) Then there is a unique 
* d , 
* ˆ d d < , such that if 
* ˆ d d d < < , then optimal decision is to not file, and if  d d <
* , then 
optimal decision is to file. This case highlights an interesting dynamic. In this case, 
relatively high debt limits additionally affect a consumer’s decision to file. That is, even 
when exemptions are relatively small as compared to a consumer’s desired debt (when 
not filing), she may decide to file, if her debt limit is sufficiently high to make the 
intertemporal consumption tradeoff valuable. This sufficiently high threshold is 
characterized by 
* d . Recall from a previous case that if  d d = ˆ  and  , then 
* ˆ d d >
) , file ( ) , not (
* d U d U > . In other words, if exemptions are the same as net wealth after 
maximum debt payoff, but consumer’s optimal use of debt is smaller than maximum debt 
allowed, then it is beneficial for the consumer to not file, essentially because the 
additional consumption in period 1 from additional debt does not compensate for the 
decrease in consumption in state g that results from filing. Therefore, for d  slightly 
larger than  ,  d ˆ ) , file ( ) , not (
* d U d U > . However, in the region [ ) ∞ ,
* d , 
, and,  0 / ) , not (
* = ∂ ∂ d d U ( ) 0 ' / ) , file ( > = ∂ ∂ d u d d U . In other words, maximum utility 
from filing is strictly increasing in d , while maximum utility from not filing is constant. 
Moreover, u  is unbounded above. Consequently, there is a unique 
* d , 
* ˆ d d < , such that 
for each d , if 
* ˆ d d d < < , then optimal choice is to not file, and if  d d <
* , then optimal 




The models above shed more light on the behavior of these different consumers. These 
differences can yield testable predictions, and can help understand some otherwise 
puzzling results. 
 
One clear distinction between the strategic timing and adverse events theory is that for 
strategic timing consumers, the bankruptcy decision and the debt and consumption 
decisions are jointly determined, whereas for adverse events consumers, the debt decision 
is exogenous to the filing decision. 
 
A second distinction is that adverse events consumers may file less frequently than 
strategic timing consumers. This can complement other arguments for why households 
filing for bankruptcy form only a small fraction of households that would gain from 
bankruptcy, (see, for example, FHW, or White (1998).)  
 
  18Another intuitive comparative statics result that can be seen formally here is that debt use 
by adverse events consumers is sometimes less, and never more than that for strategic 
timing consumers. Of course, when debt limits are sufficiently low, both types might 
decide to use maximum possible debt, and in this case, debt levels are the same. But 
notice that the optimal debt level for adverse events consumers can be lower than that for 
strategic timing consumers, because 
( ) ( )
() () []
() [] d MU d u
d MU d r w u r d u




b b g g
AE
, file ) ( '
, not ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( '
) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) (
= <
= + − + − <
+ − + − + − + − =
π δ
π δ π δ
 
 
In particular,  ( ) ( ) 0 , not
* * = <





  19Table 1: First Stage Regression Results 
 Least  Square    Log-normal 
 Wealth  Debt    log(wealth)  log(Debt) 
Divorce Dummy  -16,896  235    -.144  .047 
 (-1.80)*  (.53)    (-3.92)  (1.53) 
Period of Unemployment  -5,708  274    -.0072  .017 
 (-.68)  (.79)    (-.35)  (1.07) 
(Period of Unemployment)
2 95.3 -28.3    -1.17e-4  -.0012 
 (.19)  (-1.46)    (-.09)  (-1.27) 
Health Problem Dummy  7,673  614    -.233  -.0098 
 (.68)  (1.47)    (-7.72)  (-.47) 
Lagged Bankruptcy Rate  -5.62e+5  24,311    -2.74  .917 
 (-1.78)  (1.71)    (-2.69)  (1.24) 
Household Income or   4.07    .061    .254  .108 
    log(household income) at t-1  (10.6)  (2.35)    (28.0)  (18.2) 
Income Reduction at t-1  -6.37  -.074    -1.05e-5  -2.58e-6 
  (-6.31) (-1.76)   (-8.54)  (-3.82) 
Age of Head  612  79.3    .028  .0029 
 (.57)  (2.21)    (9.03)  (1.39) 
(Age of Head)
2 49.4 -1.04    -3.44 -4.3e-5 
 (4.36)  (-2.36)    (-1.10)  (-2.10) 
Years of Education 2,249  138    .033  .010 
 (3.76)  (4.25)    (9.12)  (5.09) 
Family Size  -6,359  193    -.031  .043 
 (-3.56)  (1.75)    (-6.17)  (11.5) 
Own Business  2.82e+5  2,333    .871  .173 
 (15.6)  (3.64)    (38.2)  (10.0) 
Own House  75,999  -338    1.88  .081 
 (12.2)  (-.94)    (85.9)  (6.42) 
Lawyers per capita  50,909  -4,704    1.15  -.097 
 (.93)  (-1.10)    (6.30)  (-.73) 
County unemployment rate  -25,474 -1,480    -.073  -.017 
  (-2.56) (-3.69)   (-2.94)  (-.89) 
State Income Growth  97,473  -18,478    -.029  -.349 
 (.63)  (-3.36)    (-.07)  (-1.13) 
State Income Deviation  17,873  42.6    -.0026  .045 
 (3.26)  (.09)    (-.11)  (2.55) 
Dummy for zero income        2.29  .94 
       (25.6)  (16.1) 
Dummy for negative wealth         -9.42  1.54 
                  (-362)  (49.8) 
Dummy for zero wealth or         -8.89  -7.66 
          zero debt        (-296)  (-624) 
Constant -1.04e+6  4,306    5.58  6.14 
  (-1.78) (1.69)   (26.8)  (40.1) 
Std dev of log of the density         1.26  .984 
       (162)  (166) 
Correlation coefficient        -.0077 
       (-1.37) 
Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
No of observations  58,466  58,464    56,179  56,179 
  * t-statistic calculated from the robust standard error is in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Results from Probit Regressions for Specification (1) 
(Independent variable: file for bankruptcy or not) 
First stage method  Least Square    Log-normal 
 Observed  Least  square    Observed  Log-normal 
Financial Benefit  4.67e-5  -8.41e-5   2.67e-5  1.84e-5 
 (4.44)*  (-2.15)    (4.41)  (1.21) 
(Financial Benefit)
2 -7.51e-10 8.42e-9    -2.38e-10  4.28e-11 
 (-2.30)  (1.57)    (-2.30)  (.06) 
Lagged Bankruptcy Rate  5.82  6.18    5.91  5.72 
 (2.66)  (2.27)    (2.21)  (2.12) 
Household Income at t-1  -5.04e-6  -6.01e-6    -4.86e-06  -4.80e-06 
 (-3.56)  (-4.32)    (-3.52)  (-3.49) 
Reduction in Income at t-1  -2.14e-6  -1.86e-6    -2.14e-06  -2.16e-06 
 (-3.60)  (-3.19)    (-2.13)  (-3.67) 
Age of Head  .029  .031    .029  .030 
 (2.14)  (2.27)    (2.13)  (2.22) 
(Age of Head)
2 -4.87e-04 -5.34e-4    -4.88e-04  -5.02e-04 
 (-3.10)  (-3.39)    (-3.11)  (-3.20) 
Years of Education  -.031 -.026    -0.030  -.028 
 (-2.70)  (-2.25)    (-2.63)  (-2.42) 
Family Size  .038  .051    .049  .042 
 (2.25)  (3.11)    (2.42)  (2.60) 
Own Business  .041  -.046    .032  .019 
 (0.45)  (.049)    (.35)  (.21) 
Own House  -.140  -.224    -.138  -.129 
 (-1.88)  (-2.89)    (-1.84)  (-1.69) 
Lawyers per capita  -.784  -.857    -.773  -.759 
 (-1.05)  (-1.16)    (-1.04)  (-1.04) 
County unemployment rate  .095  .109    .091  .105 
 (.92)  (1.05)    (.88)  (1.01) 
State Income Growth  -2.35  -2.37    -2.39  -2.17 
 (-1.95)  (-1.95)    (-1.99)  (-1.82) 
State Income Deviation  -.127  -.127    -.122  -.121 
 (-1.47)  (-1.46)    (-1.41)  (-1.38) 
Constant -2.35  -2.29    -2.37  -2.47 
 (-3.31)  (-3.15)    (-3.31)  (-3.42) 
Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
No of observations  55,614  55,614    55,614  55,269 
Hausman Test Statistic  9.62    11.71 
Generalized Hausman  55.3    63.5 
Degress of freedom  58    58 
  * t-statistic calculated from the robust standard error is in parenthesis. 
 
  21Table 3: Results from Probit Regressions for Specification (2) 
(Independent variable: file for bankruptcy or not) 
First stage method  Least Square    Log-normal 
 Observed Least  square    Observed  Log-normal 
Debt 4.77e-5  -8.53e-5   2.74e-5  1.84e-5 
 (4.52)*  (-2.16)    (4.53)  (1.22) 
Debt
2 -7.49e-10 8.73e-9   -2.42e-10  5.07e-11 
 (-2.31)  (1.61)    (-2.36)  (.07) 
Non-exempt -1.16e-5 5.78e-4    1.03e-5  .0011 
 (-.57)  (2.42)    (.58)  (2.38) 
Non-exempt
2 4.92e-9 -2.82e-8    4.49e-9  -4.44e-7 
 (1.25)  (-.42)    (1.35)  (2.63) 
Debt x Non-exempt  -4.08e-9  -6.13e-8   -4.22e-9  7.89e-9 
 (-1.07)  (-.84)    (-1.31)  (.11) 
Lagged Bankruptcy Rate  5.76  6.15    5.85  5.55 
 (2.16)  (2.26)    (2.18)  (2.05) 
Household Income at t-1  -5.04e-6  -6.02e-6    -4.87e-6  -4.76e-6 
 (-3.57)  (-4.29)    (-3.52)  (-3.47) 
Reduction in Income at t-1  -2.14e-6  -1.87e-6    -2.14e-6  -2.17e-6 
 (-3.60)  (-3.22)    (-3.62)  (-3.68) 
Age of Head  .029  .031    .029  .030 
 (2.09)  (2.26)    (2.09)  (2.21) 
(Age of Head)
2 -4.80e-4 -5.33e-4    -4.81e-4  -5.00e-4 
 (-3.05)  (-3.37)    (-3.07)  (-3.19) 
Years of Education  -.031 -.026    -.031  -.028 
 (-2.72)  (-2.33)    (-2.66)  (-2.39) 
Family Size  .037  .051    .039  .042 
 (2.19)  (3.10)    (2.36)  (2.52) 
Own Business  .048  -.040    .038  .021 
 (.52)  (-.43)    (.41)  (.23) 
Own House  -.134  -.221    -.131  -.124 
 (-1.80)  (-2.86)    (-1.75)  (-1.61) 
Lawyers per capita  -.766  -.828    -.757  -.748 
 (-1.02)  (-1.12)    (-1.02)  (-1.02) 
County unemployment  .100  .112    .096  .106 
        rate  (.95)  (1.07)    (.91)  (1.01) 
State Income Growth  -2.34  -2.36    -2.39  -2.20 
 (-1.94)  (-1.94)    (-1.98)  (-1.82) 
State Income Deviation  -.127  -.129    -.123  -.123 
 (-1.47)  (-1.48)    (-1.41)  (-1.39) 
Constant -2.36  -2.31    -2.37  -2.47 
 (-3.30)  (-3.15)    (-3.31)  (-3.41) 
Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
No of observations  55,614  55,614    55614  55269 
Hausman Test Statistic  -7.00    -.94 
Generalized Hausman  58.3    59.5 
Degrees of freedom  58    62 
  * t-statistic calculated from the robust standard error is in parenthesis. 
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